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Export, Assembly-line FDI or FDI with the Possibility of Technology
Diffusion: Optimal Entry Mode for Multinationals
Summary
The paper tries to evaluate the optimal entry mode of a Multinational Company that is
choosing among export, fragmented production structure with assembly-line FDI in
LDC or complete production in LDC with FDI. The results show that if the plant
installation cost is sufficiently high then the firm will find it profitable to export the
finished product to the LDC market and the Government will not exercise any IPR
restriction. If plant installation cost is below a certain critical level the MNC chooses
complete LDC production with FDI over assembly-line FDI if the IPR restriction is
strong, where the model assumes that a fake producer can copy the product if complete
production takes place in LDC. In such a situation government will choose to protect
IPR if government earning exceeds the cost of IPR protection, otherwise no monitoring
is the optimal strategy of the government and MNC will choose the strategy of
fragmented production structure and assembly-line FDI will take place in LDC.
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1. Introduction
The relationship between strong intellectual property rights protection, foreign direct investment
and technology transfer is an issue of great interest. Protection of intellectual property rights is
becoming a challenge to less-developed and developing countries like India. An interesting report
on THE ECONOMIC TIMES shows how counterfeit and fake products have infested the Indian
market. The report says that India tops the world counterfeit pharma products. Over 35% of the
automotive parts sold in India are fake while the value of counterfeit and pirated software is over
$ 1.5 billion. Such a glaring figure shows the importance of IPR restrictions in a developing
economy like India.1
Empirical evidences showed that poor IPR protection rate would lead to low level of technology
transfer. The study by Bascavusoglu & Zuniga (2001) examines how international differences in
foreign patent protection affect decisions to transfer technology. The paper empirically evaluates
the role of intellectual property protection, technology endowments and market size on
technology receipts of French firms from abroad. Results show that high technology sectors such
as chemicals, pharmaceuticals, manufacturing of machines and instruments, electronics, etc. are
indeed more sensitive to IPR protection overseas. On the other hand, IPR in low-technology
sectors have a negative effect, but are not significant.
An empirical study by Wakasugi and Ito (2005) showed that for Japanese Multinational firms
technology transfer measured by royalty payments of affiliate to parent firms is substantial in the
countries where the enforcement of IPRs is strict, and that it increases in the countries where IPRs
are strengthened. Another empirical study by Smarzynska Javorcik (2004) sheds light on the
relationship between intellectual property right protections and structure of foreign direct
investment using unique firm-level data set describing investment projects in Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union. First, the study indicates that investors in sectors relying heavily on
protection of intellectual property are deterred by a weak IPR regime in a potential host country.
There is also some evidence that weak IPR protection may discourage all investors, not just those
in the sensitive sectors. Second, the lack of IPR protection deters investors from undertaking local
production and encourages them to focus on distribution of imported products. Interestingly, this
effect is present in all sectors, not only those relying heavily on IPR protection.
Given the empirical findings Governments all over the world tries to create an investment
friendly environments hoping that multinational corporations will bring new technologies,

1
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management skills and marketing know-how2. In the light of the above findings the present study
theoretically explains the relationship between IPR restriction and structure of foreign investment.
The study tries to find out different social welfare maximizing rate of IPR protection on the basis
of which a foreign multinational firm is deciding whether to enter the LDC market via foreign
direct investment or just export the product and secondly if enters via FDI it also considers the
choice between assembly-line FDI which implies a fragmented production structure where the
high technology intensive production procedure is undertaken in developed IPR protected
economies and assembly-line activities are transferred to less developed weak IPR protected
economies
process.

3

and finally FDI with transfer of disembodied technology and complete production

4

2

A ready reference of the change in attitude is evident in the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry. After
independence the Indian Patent Act, 1970 was enforced to ensure rapid industrialization in a newly
independent country as well as serve public interest in a balanced manner. The main feature of the Patent
Act of 1970 was complete absence of product patent for pharmaceutical, food and chemical based products.
The industrial sector was also covered by process patent. In order to integrate the country with the global
pharmaceutical industry the Patent Act, 1970 has been amended in March, 2005. The new Patent Act
introduces a product patent regime, covering drugs, foods and chemicals. This is in compliance with the
TRIPS Agreement of WTO designed to bring an end to the copy of drugs patented abroad by Indian
pharma companies. This was allowed under the previous Act as long as the Indian companies used different
manufacturing processes. Thus the Parliament of India approved the 3rd Patents (Amendment Bill), 2005
expecting to encourage foreign investment in research and development projects consequently benefiting
the Indian economy. As expected the FDI in the pharma industry is estimated to be $ 172 million during
2005-06 recording a CAGR of 62.6% during the period 2002-06.In case of R&D, in 2005-06 the R&D
expenditure of 50 major companies totaled $495.19 million growing at a rate of 26% over the previous
year. This shift to a higher growth path is largely attributable to the new product patent act in 2005.
Pharmaceutical Industry Analysis News by Bio Spectrum Asia: http:// www.biospectrumasia.com
3

A common example of this type of FDI is in the case of Coca Cola - one of world’s leading beverage
suppliers. The MNC prepares the concentrate in the United States which is then exported to different
countries where the bottling units of the MNC are located either as complete subsidiary units or as joint
ventures.
4

In this respect we must mention the Public Notice No. 60 issued by the Ministry of Commerce,
Government of India in December 1997, to increase the technology intensive FDI in automobile sector of
India. The policy placed import of capital goods and automotive components under open general license,
but restricted import of cars and automotive vehicles in Completely Built Unit (CBU) form or in
Completely Knocked Down (CKD) or in Semi Knocked Down (SKD) condition. Car manufacturing units
were issued licenses to import components in CKD or SKD form only on executing a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) with the Director General Foreign Trade (DGFT). 11 companies signed MOUs with
DGFT under which they agreed to:
1. Establish actual production of cars and not merely assemble vehicles;
2. Bring in a minimum foreign equity of US $ 50 Million if a joint venture involved majority foreign
equity ownership;
3. Indigenise components up to a minimum of 50% in the third and 70% in the fifth year or earlier
from the date of clearance of the first lot of imports. Thereafter the MOU and import licensing will
abate;
4. Neutralise foreign exchange outgo on imports (CIF) by export of cars, auto components etc.
(FOB). This obligation was to commence from the third year of start of production and to be

3
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A large number of theoretical papers have dealt with the matter of technology transfer and entry
of foreign firms in the LDC market. 5 However none of the papers considered the case of
multinational firms’ decision over assembly line FDI vis-à-vis transfer of complete technology
and production in the LDC via FDI under different IPR regime.
The paper on IPR and the mode of technology transfer by Viswasrao (1993) formulates a model
where the lack of IPR protection in the Southern countries affect the nature of licensing contract
offered by the North as well as the mode of technology transfer. The choices available are
examined in a partial equilibrium game theoretic setting where asymmetric information adversely
affects licensing of low cost technologies to the South. The paper concludes that northern firm
may opt for subsidiary production or monopoly licensing which lowers Southern welfare.
Nicholson (2000) in a theoretical paper considered the manner in which multinational enterprises
facilitate technology transfer from the North to the South, and the role-played by the protection of
intellectual property. Different industries respond to changes in intellectual property protection
(IPP) regimes differently, and alter their mode of entry accordingly. Firms with complex but
easily imitable products will tend to internalize production through foreign direct investment, but
firms that face a lower risk of imitation will tend to license production to non-affiliated Southern
firms.
Paper by Zigic (1998) rejects the common belief that the South generally benefits from relaxing
IPR protection while the North is worse off in a North- South duopoly framework with
technological spill over. In this respect the congruence of interest with respect to Southern IPR

fulfilled during the currency of the MOU. From the fourth year imports were to be regulated in
relation to the exports made in the previous year.
However this notice was abolished with effect from 01-04-2001. On December 21, 2001, the World
Trade Organisation's dispute settlement body (DSB) arrived at a decision that the 'indigenisation'
condition, as contained in Public Notice No. 60 and in the MoUs entered into there under, is in
violation of Article III:4 of GATT 1994 as at the date of its establishment. With the Panel having
announced its decision, India would not be able to impose, in any manufacturing area, conditions of
the kind specified in its December 1997 notification, so long as it remains a member of the WTO.
Sources:
a) Auto Policy, Government of India, Ministry of Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises, Department
of Heavy Industry, New Delhi, March 2002.
b) Frontline, Volume 19,Issue 1, Jan05-18, 2002, Published by The Hindu,
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1901/19011030.htm
5

According Maskus (1998) the increase in international investments in nineties and problem of protection
of IPR in the same period has led to the inquisitiveness about the link between technology transfer and IPR
protection. A number of papers (Helpman (1993), Lai (1998), Yang and Muskus (2001)) used endogenous
growth models to show that protecting IPR could benefit the South by increasing the flow of technology to
the South. The papers also considered the role of IPR protection on rate of FDI and rate of innovation.
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protection regime should not be an exceptional or impossible state of affairs. Paper by Zigic
(2000) analyzed the issue of optimal tariffs when the Northern and Southern firms compete in
quantities in an imperfectly competitive Northern market and there are potentially varying
degrees of intellectual property rights (IPR) violation by the South. IPR violation is reflected
through the leakage of technological knowledge (“spillovers”) from the Northern to the Southern
firm creating unit cost reduction. It is shown that optimal tariffs in this framework are always
higher than in the simple duopoly model. However this paper did not discuss the matter of foreign
direct investment.
Similarly Again a paper by Mattoo, Olarreaga & Saggi (2003) explores the preferences of a
foreign firm and a welfare maximizing host country government over two modes of FDI - direct
entry or acquisition of existing domestic firms in the presence of costly technology transfer. The
paper shows that a purely welfare maximizing government might use FDI restrictions in order to
influence the foreign firms choice between different modes of entry. However this paper does not
give insights about the intellectual property right protection and entry of foreign firm in the LDC
market.
The model developed by Eicher and Kang (2004), tried to integrate optimal entry modes as a
function of market size, FDI, fixed cost tariffs and transport costs. The results highlight that even
in presence of high tariffs large countries are more likely to attract accusation investment while
intermediate sized countries may be predominantly served by trade. In this case also the issue of
IPR protection has not been analysed.
The matter of IPR protection and FDI decision is analysed in the paper by Naghavi (2005) in a
North South framework. The model endogenizes Southern IPR policy and the Northern firm’s
decision on whether to serve the Southern market through exports to obstruct exposure of its
technology or by engaging in FDI to avoid trade costs. Southern firm is assumed to be incapable
of acquiring the production technology unless the Northern firm moves production to the South.
In other words, the Northern firm acquires a monopoly position by producing at home. If the
Northern firm chooses to move production to the South, the Southern firm can enter the market
and the two firms compete in a Cournot duopoly setting. Furthermore, the Northern firm is
capable of engaging in R&D aimed at innovating more cost-effective production technologies.
Knowledge gained through R&D is however assumed to have a public good character and can be
imitated at zero cost. The model results show that a strict IPR regime is optimal for Southern firm
as it triggers technology transfer by inducing FDI in less R&D intensive industries and stimulates
innovation by pushing multinationals to deter entry in high-technology sectors.

5
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In the present paper we try to analyze the optimal entry mode for multinationals where the choice
for the MNC firm is from any of the following options:
• Conduct the entire production in the developed IPR protected country and then export the
finished product to the LDC
• Fragment the production between DC and LDC and shift the assembly-line units to LDC
• Implementing the entire production in the LDC
Like Nagavi (2005) the model assumes that the imitator firm in LDC market is incapable of
acquiring the production technology unless the Northern firm moves complete production to the
LDC market. If the MNC chooses to move production to the LDC, the imitator firm can enter the
market and the two firms compete in a duopoly setting where MNC acts as a Stackelberg leader.
In other words the product imitation is not possible if the MNC adopts the export strategy or the
fragmented production strategy and thereby invests in assembly-line units only. In this case also
we have endogenised the choice of IPR protection rate by the LDC Government and it appears as
a monitoring authority extracting a penalty in case of IPR violations from the fake LDC firm.
Lastly the welfare implications of the different modes of entry are examined.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the basic model and the
assumptions. Section 3 gives the optimal strategy choice of the MNC. Section 4 describes the
welfare maximizing choice of IPR protection rate by Government. Finally Section 5 gives the
conclusion.
2. Model
The model considers a MNC located in the Developed Country (DC) with the following options
for production:
(1) It can produce entirely in the DC market and export the finished product to the LDC with a
per unit positive shipment cost.
(2) It can fragment the production process in two stages between the DC and the LDC. In the first
stage, production of the core material takes place in the DC.
In the second stage assembling of the core material takes place in the LDC. A common example
of this type of production is in the case of Coca Cola - one of world’s leading beverage suppliers.
The MNC prepares the concentrate in the United States, which is then exported to different
countries where the bottling units are located.
(3) It can undertake the entire production in the LDC by opening up the entire manufacturing and
assembling unit with FDI. Here the Government is introduced as a monitoring authority to restrict
technology leakage to other competing LDC firms. The model assumes that, in the third case,

6
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where the production of core materials is taking place in LDC market, leakage of technology can
take place.
This will in turn lead to entry of competitive domestic firm if the IPR protection regime is weak.
The model considers the following functional forms.
The DC firm is facing a linear demand function which is given as

q=a− p

1.

where q = quantity demanded
p = price of the final product
a = market size parameter introduced as a positive constant
Specification of ‘a’ is given in the following way:
If a > 1 the LDC market is large.
If 0 < a < 1 the LDC is not sufficiently large.
Given this demand function we proceed with the production option for the DC firm under the
three different production options.
Case 1: Production Conducted Entirely in DC and product exported to LDC.
First, we consider the situation where the foreign firm is undertaking the entire production
process in her own country.
The Total Cost function of the DC firm is defined as follows:

c DC = cq + A + tq

2.

The model assumes that the production process is divided in two stages. In the first stage of
production core material are produced by undertaking the sunk cost A. and in the second stage of
production the assembling or finishing tasks are undertaken by incurring a per unit variable cost c
and t be the per unit positive shipment cost for transferring the finished product from the DC to
the LDC.
The profit function of DC firm is defined as follows:

π Export = pq − cq − tq − A
= (a - q)q - cq - tq - A

3.

From the First Order profit maximizing conditions we get the monopoly output, price and profit
of the DC firm as follows:

7
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(a −c −t )
2
(a + c +t )
=
2
( a − c − t )2
=
−A
4

q exp ort =
p exp ort

π

exp ort

4.

Case 2: Fragmented Production Structure between DC and LDC
Secondly the DC firm may choose the strategy of fragmenting the production between the DC
and LDC. Thus it can conduct the manufacturing part in the DC, (thus bringing in embodied
technology to the LDC) and complete the assembling part in the LDC. The Total Cost function of
the DC firm is given by

c Frag = wq + A + tq + F

5.

Where w is the per unit cost of assembling the semi finished product in the LDC. It is assumed
that w < c due to cheap labor in the LDC. t is the per unit shipment cost to transfer the
intermediate product to the LDC. For simplicity it is assumed to be same as the shipment cost of
the finished product and F is the initial plant installation cost to transfer the production partly to
the LDC. A is the sunk cost of production undertaken in the DC to manufacture the core material.
The profit function of the DC firm under fragmentation is given as

π Frag = pq − wq − tq − a − F

6.

= (a - q)q - wq − tq − a − F

From the first order profit maximizing conditions equilibrium quantity, price level and profit are
given as follows:

(a − w−t )
2
(a + w+t )
=
2
( a − w − t )2
=
− A− F
4

qFrag =
pFrag

π Frag

7.

The price output combinations are the monopoly combinations of the DC firm since
the firm is the sole producer of the good in the LDC market.
Case 3. Complete Production in the LDC
The third alternative to the DC firm is to produce entirely in the LDC through FDI and undergo
complete technology transfer. That is in this case the DC firm is bringing in disembodied
technology to the LDC. The DC firm will act as a monopolist in the LDC until and unless a fake

8
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producer (producing with diffused technology from the DC firm) enters the market. Thus with the
entry of the fake producer both the firms will operate as duopolists reaching a Sub Game Perfect
Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) where incumbent DC firm acts as a leader and fake firm operates as
follower. The impact of IPR restrictions is introduced in the form of a Government Sector acting
as a monitoring authority trying to resist technology diffusion and entry of the fake producer.
Extracting a penalty or lump sum punishment charge from the fake producer does this.
Thus the game plan for the DC firm or the foreign investor is
(1) Initiate production entirely in the LDC as a monopolist.
(2) Technology diffuses to another LDC firm who enters the market by producing exact replica of
the original product. Both the firms operate as quantity competitors in a leadership follower-ship
(3) The Government enters and tries to detect the fake producer. The probability of detection of
the fake producers is ( 1 − α ) where 0 < α ≤ 1 .6 If detected the DC firm or the foreign investor
continue acting as the monopolist otherwise he can at best be a Stackelberg leader with the fake
producer acting as a follower.
Assumptions
Let α be the probability of the entry of the fake producer.
Let A be the sunk cost of production incurred by the foreign investor and F be the plant
installation cost of the foreign firm in the LDC. As assumed in the previous model w (this symbol
is different) is per unit assembling cost of the semi-finished product in the LDC. Let G be the
government punishment/penalty cost to be paid by the fake producer if detected. Let C be the cost
of acquiring technology to be incurred by the fake producer. The fake producer does not have to
incur the fixed cost F for plant installation.
The expected profit of the incumbent DC firm is given by

π Incumbent = {( 1 − α )(( a − q1 )q1 − wq 1 ) + α ( q1 ( a − q1 − q 2 ) − wq 1 )} − A − F
= {q1 ( a − q1 ) − wq 1 − αq1 q 2 − A − F }

8.

Where q1 be the output of the incumbent DC firm and q2 be the output of the fake producer.
The expected profit of the fake producer may be given as:

π fake = α [( a − q1 − q 2 )q 2 − wq 2 − A] − ( 1 − α )G − C

9.

( 1 − α )G be the expected penalty paid by the fake producer if detected. Solving for

δπ fake
= 0 gives
δq

6

α >0

implies that perfect monitoring is impossible as monitoring by the government is costly.

9
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q2 =

a − q1 − w
2

10.

This is the reaction function of the fake producer. Given the reaction function of the fake
producer the reduced form profit of the incumbent DC firm is defined in the following way:

π Incumbent = {q1( a − q1 ) − wq1 − αq1( a − q1 − w ) / 2 − A − F }
Maximising this with respect to q1 gives

q1LDC =

(a − w)
2

11.

From (10) the equilibrium output level of fake producer is given as

q 2 LDC =

(a − w)
4

12.

Let pLDC be the expected price under this situation7. It is given as

 a + 3w 
 a + w   a(2 - α ) + w(2 + α ) 
p LDC = α 

 + ( 1 − α )
 =
4
 4 
 2  

The equilibrium profits of the incumbent and fake firm are given as:

π Incumbent
π fake =

( a − w )2 ( 2 − α )
=
− A− F
8

α( a − w )2
16

8a.

− αA − ( 1 − α )G − C

9a.

π fake ≥ 0
⇒α ≥

16 ( G + C )
= αˆ
( a − w ) 2 − 16 A + 16 G

13.

Thus the fake producer enters the market for α ∈ [α̂ ,1] 8
Thus a high punishment level (G) or a high cost of copying technology C, or a high level of sunk
cost of production deters the entry of fake producer.
For α < αˆ the incumbent firm acts as a monopolist and earns his monopoly profit given as

π mono =
Incumbent

( a − w )2
− A− F
4

8b.

In the next section we try to find the optimal strategy choice by the DC firm under different IPR
regime and different level of plant set up cost in LDC under foreign direct investment.
7

In this case when both incumbent and the fake producer operates in the market the price is given as
(a+3w)/4 and if the fake producer does not enter the market the price is given as (a+w)/2.
8
A high value of G will increase α̂ , and that will reduce the profitability of fake production.
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3. Optimal Strategy Choice of the MNC.
As already mentioned the DC firm has three possible strategies:
First it can choose the export strategy where the production is taking place in the developed
country.
Second it can fragment the production process. In this case core materials are produced in the
developed country only the finishing or the assembling part takes place in the LDC.
Third it can produce the commodity entirely in the LDC.
First we compare the profit of the DC firm under export and fragmented production process
Proposition 1
For certain values of plant installation cost (below the critical level given by F*) the incumbent
firm prefers the fragmented production structure than the export strategy. Again larger market
size prefers this move while the higher transport cost discourages such effort, where

F* =

( 2a − w − c − 2t )( c − w )
.
4

Proof:

π Frag − π exp ort
( a − w − t )2
 ( a − c − t ) 2

=
− A − F − 
− A
4
4

 

Now π Frag ≥ π exp ort implies that

F≤

( a − w − t ) 2 ( a − c − t ) 2 ( 2a − w − c − 2t )( c − w )
−
=
4
4
4

It is assumed that F* =

( 2a − w − c − 2t )( c − w )
4

14
15

F* be the critical level of cost of opening a production or assembly line unit in the less developed
country. If actual value of F is above this level, from equation (14) it is clear that the foreign firm
will choose the export strategy over the fragmentation strategy, only a low level of F will induce
the fragmented production structure.
Now let us analyze the impact of different parameters on the critical value of F.
(1) Impact of market size parameter on F*

δF * 1
= >0
δa
2
If the market size increases the critical value of F increases. This increases the range of values of
cost of foreign investor to set up a plant in the LDC for which the fragmented production

11
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structure is profitable than the export strategy. Thus a large market size encourages fragmented
market structure.
(2) Impact of transport cost on critical value of F*

δF *
1
=− <0
δt
2
If the transport cost (cost of exporting the finished product to the LDC or transferring the
intermediate product to the LDC) increases, the critical value of F decreases. This implies that
increase in transport cost reduces the fragmented profit at the higher rate than the profit under
export strategy for higher values of plant setup cost, that is critical value of F decreases for
increase in transport cost. Thus a higher transport cost discourages the fragmented production
structure compared to export strategy.
Next we compare the profit under fragmented and complete LDC strategy.
Proposition 2
The developed country firm chooses to produce completely in the LDC for the values of α in the
interval α ∈ [0 ,max(α*,αˆ )] , otherwise chooses the strategy of fragmented production, where

16 ( G + C )
4t( a − w ) − 2t 2
α̂
and
=
=α*
( a − w ) 2 − 16 A + 16 G
( a − w )2
Proof:
It has been shown that if the actual value of α < αˆ then incumbent firm operates as a monopolist
in the market and gains a profit given by equation 8b. This profit always dominates the profit
under fragmentation given by equation 7 as long as the transportation cost t is positive. Hence for

α < αˆ the firm always chooses the complete LDC strategy to fragmentation.
Alternatively if α ≥ αˆ , the fake producer operates at the market along with the incumbent firm.
In that case, comparing profits of the incumbent firm to that of fragmentation strategy we get the
following results:

π Incumbent − π Frag ≥ 0
 ( a − w − t )2

( a − w )2 ( 2 − α )
=
− A − F − 
− A − F ≥ 0
8
4

 

4t( a − w ) − 2t 2
Implies that α ≤
=α*
( a − w )2

16

Thus, if the fake producer actually operates in the LDC market (i.e. if α ≥ αˆ ) then the incumbent
DC firm chooses complete LDC strategy if α ≤ α * .

12
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As already mentioned the DC firm always chooses the complete LDC strategy to fragmentation
strategy for α < αˆ .
So when αˆ < α * , the firm chooses complete LDC up to α = α * , beyond which fragmented
strategy is adopted. Alternatively if αˆ > α * then the firm chooses complete LDC up to

α = αˆ as in the interval 0 < α ≤ αˆ it operates as a monopolist. Beyond α̂ again fragmentation
will take place.
The comparative static analysis with respect to market size ‘a’ and the transport cost gives the
following result.
1)

δα * − 4t( a − w − t )
=
<0
δa
( a − w )3

As well as

δαˆ
< 0 which implies a higher market size encourages the fake producer to enter the
δa

market.
So a higher market size discourages complete DC production. The logic is intuitive. Higher the
market size, greater will be the profitability of production of incumbent firm as well as fake
producer. So more stringent IPR restriction is required for transfer of disembodied technology
otherwise FDI is channeled to assembly line sectors only.
Again

δα * 4( a − w − t )
=
>0
δt
( a − w )3

So if t increases α * decreases implying a higher transport cost favoring complete production in
LDC with FDI.
Next we compare the profit under export strategy and complete LDC strategy and draw the
following results.
Proposition 3
1. The firm will choose export strategy over complete LDC strategy if F ≥ F1* .
2. For

F < F1*

the incumbent firm chooses complete LDC production where

α ∈ [0 ,max( αˆ ,α1* )], otherwise export strategy is chosen.
Thus the firm chooses complete LDC if the monitoring is strong.
Where

16( G + C )
= α̂
( a − w )2 − 16 A + 16 G

 ( 2( a − w ) − t )t 
*
F * +
 = F1
4



α 1* =
F* =

8( F * − F )
+α *
( a − w )2

( 2 a − w − c − 2t )( c − w )
4
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Proof: First we compare the export strategy profit of the monopolist to monopoly profit of the
incumbent firm under complete LDC strategy when the fake producer is not entering the market.
This is possible for 0 < α < αˆ .
Monopoly
π Incumbent
− π Export

( a − w )2
 ( a − c − t )2

=
− A − 
− A − F ≥ 0
4
4

 


( 2( a − w ) − t )t 
*
⇒ F ≤ F * +
 = F1
4



17.

For values of plant installation cost above F1* , export strategy is always adopted, as in this case
even the monopoly profit under complete LDC strategy is less than that of export strategy. Next
we compare the profits for these two strategies when the fake producer operates in the market
along with incumbent firm.

π Incumbent − π Export ≥ 0
( a − w ) 2 ( 2 − α )
 ( a − c − t )2

⇒
− A − F − 
− A ≥ 0
8
4

 


α( a − w )2
( a − w )2 − ( a − c − t )2
−F≥
4
8
( 2a − w − c − t )( c + t − w )
α ( a − w )2
−F≥
4
8
This equation can be written as9

( 4 F * +2t( a − w ) − t 2 ) − 4 F α ( a − w ) 2
≥
4
8
8( F * − F ) ( 4t( a − w ) − 2t 2 )
+
≥α
( a − w )2
( a − w )2

18.

*
1

α ≥α
Thus for values of α less than α 1* the incumbent firm chooses complete LDC strategy as
compared to export strategy when fake producer operates in the market (i.e. α ≥ αˆ ).
9

( 2 a − c − w − t )( c + t − w ) can be written as

(( 2 a − c − w − 2t ) + t )(( c − w ) + t ) = ( 2 a − c − w − 2t )( c − w ) + t( 2 a − 2 w − 2t ) + t 2 .
= 4 F * + t( 2 a − 2 w − 2t ) + t 2 = 4 F * +2t( a − w ) − t 2
Where From 14 we have F * =

( 2 a − w − c − 2t )( c − w )
4
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4t( a − w ) − 2t 2
From 15 we have
=α* .
( a − w )2
Hence

⇒ α1* =

8( F * − F )
+α *
( a − w )2

19.

From 19 we have

>
<

α1* α * for F

<
F*
>

Now if F is sufficiently high (for F ≥ F1* ) 10 then α 1* ≤ 0 . In this case export strategy is chosen
for all values of α . Basically if F ≥ F1* , and 0 < α < αˆ it is shown that monopoly LDC profit
is strictly less than that of export strategy. For α ≥ αˆ when fake firm enters the market the
duopoly profit of the incumbent firm will be higher than the profit under export strategy if and
only if actual value of α is less than α 1* . In this case if F ≥ F1* then α 1* ≤ 0 and α ≤ α 1* is
impossible as 0 < α ≤ 1 . Hence export strategy is always adopted.
From 19 it is clear that α 1* > 0 if F < F1* . In that case if α 1* > αˆ then the complete LDC is
chosen for α ∈ ( 0 ,α 1*] . In this interval the firm will act as a monopolist for 0 < α ≤ αˆ , as it is
not profitable for the fake firm to enter the market for the corresponding values of α . The
incumbent firm receives the duopoly profit in the interval αˆ < α ≤ α 1* . Alternatively if α 1* < αˆ
the incumbent firm will choose complete LDC strategy for α ∈ ( 0 ,αˆ ] . The incumbent firm
receives the monopoly profit in this entire range of α values as the fake firm does not enter the
market for α < αˆ . Combining the results it is obtained that if F < F1* the complete LDC

[

]

strategy is chosen in the interval α ∈ 0 , max( αˆ ,α 1* ) , otherwise export strategy is chosen.

(Hence Proved.)
Thus combining the above three propositions the optimal strategy choice of the foreign firm can
be given as follows:
Proposition 4

1. For F ≥ F1* the foreign firm always chooses the export strategy.

10

i .e. for F > F * +α * ( a − w )2 / 8 = F * +

t ( 2( a − w ) − t )
= F1*
4

15
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2. F* < F < F1*

the

[

foreign

firm

chooses

the

complete

LDC

strategy

]

for α ∈ 0 ,max( αˆ ,α1* ) , otherwise export strategy is chosen.
3. For

0 ≤ F ≤ F * the foreign firm chooses the complete LDC strategy if

α ∈ [0 , max( αˆ ,α*)] , otherwise fragmented strategy is adopted.
The proof follows from the three other propositions.
From proposition 4 it is clear that if the cost of plant installation in LDC is very high
(i.e. F > F1* ) then the firm prefers to choose the export strategy rather than involving in any type
of FDI in the LDC. Alternatively the foreign firm will be involved in transferring disembodied
technology via FDI if and only if the rate of IPR protection is strong. In this framework
disembodied technology transfer will take place and firm will undertake the complete production
in the LDC if and only if the rate of monitoring is strong and falling in the range given by

α ∈ [0 ,max( αˆ ,min( α1* ,α*)]. Given the assumption that transfer of complete production process
to LDC may lead to entry of fake producer supplying imitation product with diffused technology
from the DC firm, the incumbent firm transfer complete production if and only if IPR protection
rate is high. When IPR protection rate is low but the cost of plant installation in LDC is also low
the incumbent firm prefers to open the assembly line units in LDC and imports embodied
technology to the LDC. 11 This fragmentation strategy is chosen if α > max( α*,αˆ ) and the plant
installation charge F ≤ F * .
4.Social Welfare Analysis
The Social Welfare comparison of the different modes of production also gives important insights
to the different modes of production chosen by the DC firm. The Social Welfare can be defined as
the sum total of profit retained by the foreign firm in the LDC, consumer surplus and Government
surplus less the cost of production, monitoring etc.
The assumption made here is that under FDI, the DC firm fully repatriates profit thus leaving
Social Welfare as the sum total of
SW = Consumer Surplus + Government Surplus - Costs
In case when production is conducted entirely in the DC, the Government Surplus and Costs are
both zero. The model assumes that if the product is exported to LDC then the probability of
product imitation does not exist. Hence Government does not incur any monitoring cost to protect
IPR of exported product. So under export strategy the social welfare is defined as

11

The model assumed that import of embodied technology does not have any technology spillover effect.

16
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SWExport

( a − c − t )2
=
8

20.

In case of fragmentation strategy the social welfare is defined as follows:

SWFrag =

( a − w − t )2
8

21.

Finally we consider the situation where the fake producer enters the market. The fake producer
will profitably operate in the market if and only if α > αˆ .
Then the ex ante level of social welfare is defined as follows:
SWLDC= Expected profit of fake producer+ Expected net level of consumer surplus + Government
Earnings.
The expected profit of the fake producer is given by 9a as

π fake =

α( a − w )2
16

− αA − ( 1 − α )G − C

The expected consumer surplus is as follows:12

CS LDC =

( a − w ) 2 ( 4 + 5α )
32

22.

The net government surplus is defined as

GS LDC = ( 1 − α )G − d ( α )

23.

Where d ( α ) is assumed to be the government monitoring cost such that d' ( α ) < 0 that is as
the monitoring cost increases the probability of entry of the fake producer decreases and vice
versa. Again d" ( α ) > 0 , implying that the monitoring cost increases at an increasing rate.
Finally it is assumed that the complete monitoring is impossible implying that

d ( α ) → ∞ when α → 0 .
Thus social welfare under complete LDC strategy when the fake producer is operating in the
market (i.e. α > αˆ ) is defined as follows:

SWLDC =

( a − w )2 ( 7α + 4 )
− αA − C − d ( α )
32

24.

12

CSLDC= (Probability that fake producer gets detected) *(Consumer surplus when incumbent firm operates
as monopolist)+ (Probability that fake producer cannot be detected)*(Consumer surplus when fake
2
producer operates along with the incumbent firm.)= α 9 ( a − w ) 2 + ( 1 − α ) 1 ( a − w ) 2 = ( a − w) ( 4 + 5α )
32
8
32
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From 24 we have the following results:
1.

dSWLDC 7( a − w ) 2
=
− A − d' ( α ) > 0
dα
32

As d' ( α ) < 0 and

24a.

7( a − w ) 2
− A > 0 (this follows from the profitability condition of the fake
32

producer.)
2.

d 2 SW
= − d" ( α ) < 0
dα 2

24b.

Otherwise in the absence of fake producer (i.e. α ≤ αˆ ) the social welfare is defined as follows:

SW LDC =

( a − w )2
− d( α )
8

25.

Finally it can be shown that equation (24) dominates equation (25) around α = αˆ .
Thus the social welfare function under complete LDC strategy is increasing in α and
discontinuous at α = αˆ .
Next we compare the level of social welfare for three possible strategies and get the following
proposition:
Proposition 5

i) For F ≥ F1* the government chooses the no monitoring strategy and foreign firm always
chooses the export strategy.
ii) For 0 ≤ F ≤ F *
when αˆ < α * and government budget is balanced or at surplus the government chooses

α opt = α * . In this case the complete LDC strategy is the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium of
the game and the fake firm operates in the market.
Alternatively when αˆ ≥ α * government chooses α opt = αˆ if SW LDC

α ≤αˆ

> SW Frag at α = αˆ

and complete LDC strategy is the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium of the game and foreign
firm operates as a monopolist in the market, otherwise no monitoring is the optimal government
strategy and fragmented strategy is the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium of the game.
iii) F* < F < F1*
when αˆ < α 1* and government budget is balanced or at surplus the government chooses

α opt = α 1* . In this case the complete LDC strategy is the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium of
the game and the fake firm operates in the market.

18
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Alternatively when αˆ ≥ α 1* government chooses α opt = αˆ if SW LDC

α ≤αˆ

> SW Export at α = αˆ

and complete LDC strategy is the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium of the game and foreign
firm operates as a monopolist in the market, otherwise no monitoring is the optimal government
strategy and export strategy is the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium of the game.

Proof:
Comparison of social welfare for export strategy and fragmented strategy gives as the following
results:

SW Frag − SW Export
=

( 2a − w − c − 2t )( c − w ) F *
=
>0
8
2

(From 15)

The consumer surplus under fragmentation strategy is higher than that of export strategy, which is
obvious as the price of the product under fragmentation strategy is lower than that of the export
strategy.
From proposition 4 it is clear that for F ≥ F1* the foreign firm always chooses the export strategy
Thus in this range for plant installation cost the domestic Government does not incur any cost to
Protect IPR and optimal value of α is α opt = 1 .
Secondly we compare the social welfare under complete LDC strategy and fragmented strategy.
But from Proposition 4 it is clear that complete LDC strategy is chosen only if

α ∈ [0 , max( αˆ ,α*)] , otherwise fragmented strategy is chosen when 0<F<F*.
For α ≤ αˆ the fake firm does not enter the market, so the difference between the Social welfare
under Fragmented strategy and Complete LDC Strategy is obtained by comparing equations (21)
and (25) as follows:

SW LDC

α ≤αˆ

 ( a − w )2 ( a − w − t )2 
− SW Frag = 
−
 − d( α )
8
8



26.

The first part is always positive, but given the assumption that d ( α ) → ∞ when α → 0 , the
equation (26 ) will assume negative values for lower values of α and as α increases and cost of
monitoring declines then (26) may assume a positive value.
Given proposition 4, for 0<F<F*, if α* < αˆ , the foreign firm chooses the complete LDC strategy
in the interval 0 < α ≤ αˆ , and beyond this level fragmented production is chosen. Given that the
Social Welfare under complete LDC strategy increases with α , the optimal value of α is α̂ , if

19
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SW LDC

α ≤αˆ

≥ SW Frag at α = αˆ and Complete LDC Strategy constitutes the sub game perfect

Nash equilibrium of the game. Otherwise if SW LDC

α ≤αˆ

< SWFrag at α = αˆ , the optimal value

of α is unity and fragmentation will be the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium of the game. 13
At α = αˆ we have

( SW LDC

α ≤αˆ

− SW Frag )α =αˆ

 ( a − w )2 ( a − w − t )2 
=
−
 − d ( αˆ )
8
8



27.

The first bracketed term is always positive. Higher the value of transport cost, higher will be the
gain in consumer surplus from Complete LDC production. However for lower values of t, gain in
consumer surplus may not be enough to cover the cost of IPR protection. In that situation the
social welfare under fragmentation may dominate that of complete LDC production and
Government chooses α = 1 and fragmentation strategy will be the sub game perfect Nash
equilibrium of the game. Hence assembly line FDI takes place.
Alternatively if for 0<F<F*, and α* ≥ αˆ , the foreign firm chooses the complete LDC strategy in
the interval 0 < α ≤ α * , and beyond this level fragmented production is chosen. Given that

α* ≥ αˆ , the incumbent firm chooses the complete LDC production strategy and acts as a
monopolist in the interval 0 < α ≤ αˆ and acts as a duopolist in the interval αˆ < α ≤ α * .
For α > αˆ

SW LDC

=

α >αˆ

− SW Frag

( a − w )2 ( 7α + 4 )
( a − w − t )2
− αA − C − d ( α ) −
32
8

7 ( a − w ) 2

 t( 2( a − w ) − t ) 
=
+
α
−
A

 − C − d(α )

8
32




28.

From (16) the above expression can be written as

SW LDC

α >αˆ

α * ( a − w ) 2 
 7( a − w ) 2

− SW Frag = 
+
α
− A − C − d ( α )


16
32





28a.

As we have mentioned SWLDC is increasing in α and discontinues at α = αˆ . Given the strategy
of the foreign firm that it chooses complete LDC strategy only in the interval 0 < α ≤ α * ,

13

It can be shown that ( SW LDC

α ≤αˆ

− SW Frag )α =αˆ is ambiguous in sign even if we assume that the

government budget is balanced.. For Proof see appendix A1.
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otherwise chooses fragmented strategy, the optimal strategy for government is to choose α = α *
if SW LDC

α >αˆ

≥ SW Frag at α = α * .

Otherwise Government chooses α = 1.
In this case it can be shown that SW LDC

α >αˆ

is higher than SW Frag at α = α * when government

budget is balanced or have a surplus. 14
Thus when 0<F<F*, if α* ≥ αˆ , the optimal strategy of the government is to choose α = α *
when the government budget is balanced or have a surplus. Otherwise if cost of monitoring is
very high such that SW LDC

α >αˆ

− SW Frag <0 at α = α * , the ‘no monitoring’ is chosen so that

α = 1 and ‘Fragmentation’ is the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium of the game. Thus in
situation of costly monitoring assembly line FDI may take place in LDC.
Finally we consider the social welfare maximizing value of α for F* < F < F1* . For this range
of plant installation cost in the LDC market from proposition 4 it is clear that the foreign firm

[

]

chooses complete LDC strategy if α ∈ 0 , max( αˆ ,α 1* ) otherwise export strategy is chosen. Like
the earlier case there will be two cases.
Firstly we consider the situation where α 1* < αˆ along with F* < F < F1* . In this case the
complete LDC strategy chosen for 0 < α < αˆ . (As the imitator does not enter the market in this
interval.). So the comparison of social welfare under export strategy and complete LDC Strategy
gives the following result:

SW LDC

α ≤αˆ

− SWexp ort

( a − w )2 ( a − c − t )2 
=
−
 − d( α )
8
8



29.

Given the assumption that ( w < c + t ) , the first bracketed term is always positive. However

d ( α ) → ∞ when α → 0 , so for lower values of α the difference is always negative. Thus
equation (29) is always ambiguous in sign. Given proposition 4 under this situation if

SW LDC

α ≤αˆ

> SWexp ort for α = αˆ , the government chooses α opt = αˆ and complete LDC

strategy will be the sub game perfect equilibrium strategy. Otherwise α opt = 1 and export
strategy will be the sub game perfect equilibrium strategy.
Next we consider the case where α 1* ≥ αˆ along with F* < F < F1* . Given that α 1* ≥ αˆ , the
incumbent firm chooses the complete LDC production strategy and acts as a monopolist in the

14

For proof see appendix A2.
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interval 0 < α ≤ αˆ and acts as a duopolist in the interval αˆ < α ≤ α 1* . Given that social welfare
under complete LDC strategy increases with α , the government will choose α opt = α 1* if

SW LDC

α >αˆ

> SWexp ort . at α = α 1* , otherwise chooses α = 1 and export strategy will be the sub

game perfect Nash equilibrium when F* < F < F1* .

SW LDC

=

α >αˆ

− SWexp ort .

( a − w ) 2 ( 7α + 4 )
( a − c − t )2
− αA − C − d ( α ) −
32
8

In this case it can be shown that SW LDC

α >αˆ

30.

is higher than SWLDC at α = α 1* when government

budget is balanced or have a surplus. 15 Thus when government budget is balanced or at surplus at

α = α 1* existence of a fake producer along with foreign firm producing the entire product in the
LDC becomes the welfare maximizing equilibrium situation.
Proposition 5 signifies the possibility of two interesting situations. Firstly there may be situations
where the foreign direct investment will flow only in the assembly line sectors i.e. the firms are
taking fragmented production strategies. Weak IPR restrictions, but low cost of foreign
investment leads to a situation where multinationals may shift the assembly line activities in the
LDCs. This situation will lead to transfer of embodied technology in the LDC, which does not
lead to spill over of knowledge. Secondly Proposition 5 also shows that there may be situations
where government is choosing an IPR protection rate that induces the entry of fake firm in the
market when the multinational is transferring the entire production process in the LDC. In this
situation disembodied technology is transmitted to less developed economies thus leading the
situation of knowledge spill over.
5. Concluding Remarks
Our model investigates how foreign firms decision to produce in the LDC market depend on the
IPR protection rate, fixed costs of plant installation, market size and transport cost of transferring
the finished product to the LDC. The impact of these parameters on the strategic entry decision of
a MNC gives some interesting results. Summing up the results we find that the entry decision of
the MNC will initially depend upon the plant installation cost of the firm in the LDC. If the plant
installation cost is sufficiently high then the firm will find it more profitable to export the finished
product to the LDC market. In such a case the Government will find it optimal to exercise no IPR
restriction in the form of monitoring mechanism as assumed in the model. Now if the plant
15

For proof see appendix A3.
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installation cost to start off production in the LDC is below the critical value defined in the model
then the choice of entry will be restricted between fragmentation or complete LDC production. In
this case decision will depend on the probability of entry of the fake producer i.e IPR restrictions
enforced by the Government. In case of low probability of entry of the fake producer the foreign
firm will undertake complete LDC production. From the Social Welfare consideration the
Government will in this case also find it optimal to impose some IPR restrictions. However the
underlying assumption made here is that the Government has a balanced or a surplus budget. If he
Government runs a budget deficit, as commonly seen in a LDC, then the government will
undertake no IPR restriction and its monitoring cost will be zero. In case if the probability of
entry of the fake producer is high that is Government imposes no or lenient IPR restriction then
the foreign firm will choose fragmented production. The other parameters of the model for
instance market size parameter, and transport cost favors fragmented or Complete LDC
production over the other modes of production.
The results enumerated briefly above find support from recent policy change undertaken in the
Indian Patent Act. Empirical analysis has also shown that Multinational Companies are not
willingly to transfer disembodied technology if they face the risk of product imitation in the LDC.
Thus in presence of weak Intellectual Property Protection the optimal policy for the MNC will be
to transfer embodied technology and FDI will take place in the assembly-line sectors only.
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Appendix A1
First we consider the case where 0<F<F*,and α* < αˆ ,
At α = αˆ

( SW LDC

α ≤αˆ

− SW Frag )α =αˆ

 ( a − w )2 ( a − w − t )2 
−
 − d ( αˆ )
8
8



=

In this case let us make the assumption that government budget is balanced or have a surplus, i.e.

( 1 − α )G ≥ d ( α )
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 ( a − w )2 ( a − w − t )2 
 ( a − w )2 ( a − w − t )2 
ˆ
≥
−
−
d
(
α
)
−


 − ( 1 − αˆ )G
8
8
8
8





Then 

At α = αˆ

α ( a − w )2
16

− αA − ( 1 − α )G − C = 0 .

This implies

 ( a − w ) 2 ( a − w − t )2 
−

 − ( 1 − αˆ )G =
8
8


2
2
( a − w )
( a − w − t )  αˆ ( a − w )2
−
+ αˆ A + C

−
8
8
16


( 2 − αˆ )( a − w )2 ( a − w − t )2
=
−
+ αˆ A + C
16
8
Given the assumption that α* < αˆ , from proposition 2 it is clear that profit of the foreign firm is
higher under fragmented strategy than that of complete LDC strategy for α = αˆ . This implies

 ( a − w )2 ( 2 − α )   ( a − w − t )2 

≤

8
4

 

Thus the sign of ( SW LDC

α ≤αˆ

− SWFrag )α =αˆ is ambiguous in nature.

Appendix A2
From 28a

SWLDC

α >αˆ

α * ( a − w ) 2 
 7( a − w ) 2

− SWFrag = 
+
α
− A − C − d ( α )


16
32





At α = α *

SWLDC

α >αˆ

α * ( a − w ) 2 
 7( a − w ) 2

− SWFrag = 
+
α
*
− A − C − d ( α*)


16
32




 9α * ( a − w ) 2 
=
 − C − d ( α*) − α * A
32



Given that α* > αˆ we have

π fake =

α( a − w )2

− αA − ( 1 − α )G − C ≥ 0
16
α( a − w )2
⇒
≥ αA + ( 1 − α )G + C
16

Thus for α = α *
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α * ( a − w )2
16

≥ α * A + ( 1 − α*)G + C

9 α * ( a − w )2 α * ( a − w ) 2
9
This in turn implies that
>
≥ α * A + ( 1 − α*)G + C as > 1
2
16
16
2
If we assume a balanced or surplus government budget then

(1 − α )G ≥ d ( α )
This in turn implies that

9 α * ( a − w )2
> α * A + ( 1 − α*)d ( α*) + C
2
16
SWLDC

α >αˆ

≥ SWFrag at α = α * .

If the government budget faces a deficit then SW LDC

α >αˆ

− SWFrag at α = α * is ambiguous in

sign.
Appendix A 3

SWLDC

=

α >αˆ

− SWexp ort .

( a − w ) 2 ( 7α + 4 )
( a − c − t )2
− αA − C − d ( α ) −
32
8

From (18) at α 1* the above expression becomes

SWLDC

α >αˆ

 9α * ( a − w )2 
*
*
− SWexp ort . =  1
 − C − d(α 1 ) − α1 A + F / 2
32



At α = α 1* the fake producer is earning a positive profit as α 1* > αˆ . This implies that

π fake =

α ( a − w )2

− αA − ( 1 − α )G − C ≥ 0 at α = α 1*

16
α ( a − w )2
⇒
≥ αA + ( 1 − α 1* )G + C
16
*
1

This in turn implies that

α * ( a − w )2
9α 1* ( a − w )2
+F/2> 1
≥ α 1* A + ( 1 − α 1* ) A + C
32
16
If we assume a balanced or surplus government budget at α = α 1* then

(1 − α 1* )G ≥ d ( α 1* )
Hence we have
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9α 1* ( a − w )2
+ F / 2 > α 1* A + d ( α 1* ) + C
32
SWLDC

α >αˆ

> SWexp ort . at α = α 1* .
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